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Abstract
In Bolivia, urbanisation increasingly takes place in peri-urban settings situated outside the bound-
aries of cities. Unlike previous research that considers peri-urban developments such as rural-to-
urban land use transitions to be characterised by state absence and little regulation and planning,
this article demonstrates that such developments occur precisely because of the presence of par-
ticular multi-scalar governance configurations. Drawing on case study material from peri-urban La
Paz, the article demonstrates how legislative reforms by Bolivia’s national government on decen-
tralisation and municipal delineation, which failed to establish clear jurisdictional boundaries, cre-
ate a situation of hyperregulation whereby multiple local authorities claim political control over
the same territory by deploying distinct and at times conflicting, legal and planning frameworks.
While hyperregulation enables a loose coalition of elite actors, including government authorities,
resident leaders of peri-urban settlements and private sector representatives, to advance specific
political and socio-economic interests, it puts ordinary residents in a situation of permanent
uncertainty. The article contributes to and further nuances conceptual debates on calculated
informality which uncover how states deliberately create legally ambiguous systems to facilitate
speculative urban developments. Unlike previous studies which highlight that this is mainly
achieved through state engineering, and particularly by suspending or violating the law, this article
demonstrates that legal ambiguity and irregularity can also be generated through multi-scalar gov-
ernance configurations that (1) involve a number of elite actors, including state authorities but
also private sector and civil society representatives and (2) create a situation in which different
regulatory systems co-exist without coordination.
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Introduction
Across the globe, urban spaces are emerging
outside the conventional boundaries of cities,
including in places associated with rurality,
tradition and nature (Brenner and Schmid,
2015; Monte-Mór, 2005). This is also the
case in Bolivia, which represents the empiri-
cal focus of this article. In recent decades,
Bolivia experienced rapid urban restructur-
ing1 and processes such as urban expansion
have contributed to the emergence of peri-
urban spaces characterised, following Allen
(2003: 136), ‘by either the loss of ‘rural’
aspects (loss of fertile soil, agricultural land,
natural landscape, etc.) or the lack of ‘urban’
attributes (low density, lack of accessibility,
lack of services and infrastructure, etc.)’.
Confirming trends noted for the wider Latin
American region (Riofrı́o, 2003; Sandia
Rondón, 2009; Ziccardi, 2020), existing
research on Bolivia often depicts peripheral
settlements as self-made by the urban poor
and refers to peri-urban developments such
as rural-to-urban land conversions and
urban infrastructure provision as informal,
irregular and subject to little or no planning
and government regulation (Blanco Cazas,
2017; Perales Miranda, 2011). One solution
to this issue, as emphasised in the New
Urban Agenda, is to formalise, control and
better regulate emerging urban spaces (UN-
Habitat, 2016: article 69).
By now, there exists a rich literature on
what could be done in terms of technical gov-
ernance and planning solutions, including
calls to establish urban regions (Simon,
2008), metropolitan governance regimes
(Heinrichs et al., 2009) or area-based man-
agement (Beall et al., 2015). Others call for
efforts to redefine city boundaries to incor-
porate peri-urban spaces within conven-
tional city limits (Angel et al., 2011; Razin
and Greg, 2017). Evidence from Bolivia,
however, suggests that such technical solu-
tions are rarely taken up and often not
desired by government authorities and other
actors operating in peri-urban spaces (Achi,
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2011; Urquizo Huici, 2017). Instead of
developing ideas on what could be done to
better regulate peri-urban developments,
more attention needs to be paid to actually
existing governance arrangements and the
different interests and political priorities of a
diversity of actors operating in these set-
tings. This article addresses this knowledge
gap.
Drawing on peri-urban neighbourhoods
situated in La Paz as an illustrative case
study (see section two), the article demon-
strates that peri-urban developments do not
occur because of a lack of government regu-
lation and planning, as claimed by previous
research on Latin America in general and
Bolivia in particular, but because of the
presence of a specific multi-scalar govern-
ance configuration.2 As revealed in section
three, local governance arrangements in
peri-urban spaces must be understood in
relation to decentralisation and municipal
delineation reforms by Bolivia’s national
government that introduce different compe-
tencies for rural and urban jurisdictions but
fail to establish clear boundaries between
these local jurisdictions.
It is argued that normative uncertainty
around municipal boundary delineation con-
tributes to the production of hyperregulated
peri-urban spaces. Building on previous
research on legal pluralism and overlapping
territories (Agnew and Oslender, 2010;
Griffiths, 1986; Lombard, 2016; von Benda-
Beckmann, 2002), hyperregulation is defined
in section four as the excessive regulation of
peri-urban spaces characterised by unre-
solved municipal boundary conflicts in
which local authorities representing different
rural and urban jurisdictions mobilise dis-
tinct political agendas and draw on, often
contradictory and conflicting, regulatory
and planning regimes.
Section five demonstrates some of the
underlying reasons for why hyperregulation
represents a preferred governance option for
a loose coalition of elite actors comprised of
government authorities, resident leaders of
peri-urban settlements and private sector
representatives. At the level of government,
elite actors predominantly include authori-
ties from the municipalities of Palca (con-
trolled by the political party Movement for
Socialism (MAS), also in charge of the
national government, and following legisla-
tion on developments in rural areas and
indigenous territories) and La Paz (con-
trolled by an opposition party and following
urban regulations and planning guidelines).
These local authorities benefit from arrange-
ments of hyperregulation as it allows them,
among other issues, to expand the territorial
reach of their jurisdiction, grow their elec-
toral support base through protecting exist-
ing or issuing new title deeds as well as
providing public infrastructure, and generate
additional revenues through taxation, ser-
vice delivery charges and building permits.
In addition to government authorities, it
is particularly local community leaders,
especially those representing indigenous resi-
dents (referred to here as comuneros) who
lived and obtained tenure rights in the area
prior to urban expansion, that benefit from
hyperregulation. Local leaders engage in a
number of speculative land developments3 in
peri-urban La Paz, including plot-by-plot
rural-to-urban land conversions (referred to
as loteamiento in Bolivia), the sale of land to
construction and mining companies and
selectively holding on to land as value
reserve. Local leaders deliberately generate
an insecure land purchase scenario in peri-
urban La Paz. For example, they tend to sell
a plot by issuing a purchase note (minuta de
compra) while holding onto their original
title deed. While this creates a situation of
tenure insecurity and permanent uncertainty
especially for ordinary residents who lack
relevant political connections and legal
know-how, local leaders use the minuta de
compra arrangement to their personal
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advantage. Holding on to the original title
deed enables local leaders to displace buyers
and/or resell plots to others; it also places
them as intermediators between local resi-
dents (who often lack tenure rights) and dif-
ferent entities of the state (who consider
tenure rights as basis for the provision of
services). In their role as intermediaries they
effectively become, to borrow from Anand
(2011), functional administrators of peri-
urban spaces. In this position, local leaders
take advantage of hyperregulation. They
make the best use of, both, urban and rural
regulatory systems by establishing connec-
tions with La Paz and Palca and tactically
manoeuvring between the political agendas
of these local governments.
The analysis presented in this article con-
tributes to and further nuances conceptual
work in urban studies on calculated inform-
ality that explores how states deliberately
create legally ambiguous systems that allow
for the selective suspension or violation of
existing laws or planning regulations to facil-
itate speculative urban developments
(Fawaz, 2017; Goldstein, 2016; Roy, 2009;
Yiftachel, 2006). The findings from peri-
urban La Paz presented in this article, how-
ever, point towards a slightly different trend.
Here regulatory systems are not necessarily
suspended, bypassed or violated but encour-
aged to co-exist without coordination, lead-
ing to incoherence in local policy and
planning interventions. It is argued that such
a situation of hyperregulation can equally
enable speculative developments in emerging
urban places. The analysis presented in this
article further points out the need to go
beyond state attempts to create ‘organised
disorder’ and, instead, to pay more attention
to how, through a series of loose coalitions
and interactions, elite actors operating
within and beyond the state manage to
exploit the legal ambiguity generated by
hyperregulation.
Case study and methodology
This article is positioned within and
informed by debates on ‘Southern urban
theory’ which challenge universalist accounts
and emphasise the need to generate context-
relevant theoretical and practical knowledge
from a particular urban place (Bhan, 2019;
Watson, 2009). Deploying a qualitative, sin-
gle case study approach, this article focuses
on one such place – peri-urban La Paz in
Bolivia – to examine how legislation on
decentralisation without clear municipal
boundary delineation leads to hyperregula-
tion and how the latter can be mobilised by
a loose coalition of elite actors.
La Paz represents an illustrative case
because of its unique position as seat of
Bolivia’s national government, which
enabled access to officials involved in the
ratification and implementation of legisla-
tion on decentralisation and municipal
boundary delineation. In addition, multiple
peri-urban land conflicts unfold in La Paz.
Since the 1960s, La Paz has more than
doubled in physical and population size
(Arbona and Kohl, 2004; Horn, 2019),
absorbing rural communities inhabited pre-
dominantly by indigenous peoples (referred
to here as comuneros) of Aymara descent.
Urban expansion has politico-administrative
implications as rural-to-urban land use
changes occur in territories claimed by dif-
ferent local governments. These include the
municipal government of La Paz but also
municipal governments of surrounding rural
areas such as Mecapaca and Palca. Palca
expresses by far the most significant territor-
ial claim, considering approximately 36,000
hectares of peri-urban land (home to 82,000
residents) in Southern La Paz as part of its
jurisdiction. It is for this reason that this arti-
cle focuses on peri-urban neighbourhoods in
Southern La Paz – namely, Achumani,
Calacoto, Chasquipampa and Ovejuyo –
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that are claimed by both La Paz and Palca.
Peri-urban neighbourhoods in Southern La
Paz, hence, represent an illustrative case
study to explore the implications of national
legislation on decentralisation and delinea-
tion for local governance and planning.
Qualitative fieldwork was carried out in
La Paz for 5 months in 2012, 3 months in
2016 and 2 weeks in 2018. This involved
content analysis of relevant national legisla-
tion on decentralisation and delineation as
well as local policy and planning documents
by the municipalities of La Paz and Palca. A
total of 38 semi-structured interviews were
carried out with senior policy makers, gov-
ernment officials and planners in Bolivia’s
national government, the municipal govern-
ments of La Paz and Palca, and residents
and private developers operating in peri-
urban neighbourhoods affected by munici-
pal boundary conflicts. Interviews were
designed to open discussions on how differ-
ent actors seek to advance their political
agenda, engage in land and other socio-
economic transactions and meet their day-
to-day needs, thereby providing insights on
the unfolding of hyperregulation.
Municipalisation without clear
jurisdictional boundaries
Urban governance shifted significantly
throughout the last five decades as national
governments transferred regulatory and
planning competencies to local governments
(Gilbert, 2006). Decentralisation reforms,
such as Bolivia’s 1994 Law of Popular
Participation (LPP), played a particularly
important role in triggering such changes
(Beard et al., 2008). This section offers a
review of these decentralisation reforms,
paying particular attention to associated
processes of local territorial restructuring
without clear delineation – a key enabling
factor for hyperregulation.
The LPP defined the competencies of
municipal governments, allowing local
authorities to charge for the registration of
plots, building permissions and service provi-
sion while enhancing their responsibility for
local planning and the delivery and mainte-
nance of public infrastructure and services
(Faguet, 2012). The LPP also outlined guide-
lines for the establishment of civic oversight
committees and introduced a participatory
planning model whereby municipal authori-
ties should work collaboratively with local
grassroots organisations (in Spanish: organi-
zación territorial de base – OTB) to elaborate
local infrastructure interventions. Like many
planning systems across the world (Allen,
2003), the LPP is guided by a rural-urban
dichotomy and outlines distinct criteria for
rural and urban areas (Antequera Durán,
2011). Rural jurisdictions are supposed to
follow national legislation on rural develop-
ment, including the 1953 Agrarian Reform
Law and the 1996 Agrarian Reform Law (in
Spanish: Ley INRA), as well as apply indi-
genous rights outlined in article 30.1 of
Bolivia’s 2009 constitution, including rights
to collective tenure, prior consultation and
autonomy. In contrast, urban jurisdictions
follow national legislation on urban develop-
ment, including the 1956 Law of Urban
Reform and the 2012 Law to Regulate
Property Rights over Urban Estates and
Housing, which focus on the provision of
universal rights and services. Present-day
rural-urban dichotomies reproduce histori-
cally established racialised and colonial ima-
ginaries of cities as planned, modern spaces
home to ‘whites’ or people of ‘mixed blood’
who are granted citizenship and access to
universal (individual) rights, and rural areas
as unplanned spaces home to indigenous
peoples who are denied citizenship status but
granted relative autonomy over collective
matters4 (Antequera Durán, 2011; Horn,
2019). As discussed in subsequent sections,
the ongoing presence of such a rural-urban
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dichotomy is problematic particularly in
peri-urban places where rural and urban
governance arrangements overlap, leading to
legal ambiguities and political tensions
between different social groups.
The LPP enhanced citizen empowerment,
participation and access to basic services
(Faguet, 2012). However, implementation of
decentralisation reforms was slower than
anticipated. The most commonly cited fac-
tors explaining implementation gaps are: (1)
the prevalence of ineffective and weak local
government institutions; (2) lack of capacity
among local authorities; and (3) lack of
political will among the authorities in charge
of local government (Kohl and Farthing,
2006; Medeiros, 2001).
Less attention has so far been paid
towards the territorial restructuring processes
accompanying the LPP. Decentralisation
reforms require careful thinking about the
establishment of jurisdictional boundaries
which spatially restrict the reach of fiscal,
policy and planning interventions by local
governments (Beard et al., 2008; Razin and
Greg, 2017). In Bolivia, territorial restructur-
ing occurred through municipalisation.
Previously existing local jurisdictions, such
as major cities like La Paz, El Alto,
Cochabamba, Sucre, Potosi, Santa Cruz and
Tarija, were expanded to include new sub-
urbs and surrounding vacant land (Faguet,
2012). Government authorities, hence, recog-
nised urbanisation trends affecting the coun-
try’s major cities and, in line with principles
of urban sprawl (Angel et al., 2011), decided
to leave room for urban expansion by estab-
lishing generous municipal boundaries. In
addition, 198 new municipalities were created
from scratch, leading to the emergence of a
total of 336 municipalities (Faguet, 2012;
Tomaselli, 2015).
Territorial restructuring, however,
occurred without establishing clearly defined
boundaries between local jurisdictions. In
La Paz, for example, territorial restructuring
was implemented as part of national law
1669 in 1995, which declares that the munici-
pality comprises not only of La Paz city but
also adjacent sparsely inhabited territories of
Hampaturi and Zongo – areas that are cur-
rently considered urban expansion sites.
Law 1669 also established the municipality
of Palca which comprises predominantly
rural areas. Coordinates that establish pre-
cise municipal boundaries between these jur-
isdictions have not been provided. When
asked about this issue, authorities in
Bolivia’s Ministry of Autonomies, currently
responsible for administering decentralisa-
tion and devolution, highlighted that gov-
ernment staff lacked technical capacity to
undertake boundary lineation in the 1990s.
Cartographic material issued by the
National Institute of Statistics and the
Institute of Military Geography, therefore,
declare that municipal boundaries only have
provisional but not legally binding status.
Legislative reforms by Bolivia’s national
government so far failed to resolve munici-
pal boundary conflicts. A first attempt
towards delineation was made in 2000
through the Law of Administrative Political
Units (LAPU). Procedural guidelines out-
lined by the LAPU follow what Razin and
Greg (2017) refer to as municipal determina-
tion, a situation whereby local authorities
can annex land in line with national govern-
ment guidelines. The annexation process
must be initiated through application by one
municipal government. Neighbouring muni-
cipalities affected by this application must
then be consulted. Municipal boundaries
can only be approved by the national gov-
ernment once all affected municipalities
reach consensus. Nearly all municipalities in
Bolivia – including Palca in the context of
peri-urban La Paz – have applied using
LAPU procedures. However, most applica-
tions remain gridlocked in the consultation
stage due to conflicting territorial demands
and a failure to reach consensus.
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To address problems of the LAPU,
Bolivia’s national government led by former
President Evo Morales introduced a new
law on delineation – the 2013 Law on
Delineation of Territorial Units (LDTU).
Like the LAPU, the LDTU process needs to
be initiated by one municipal government.
To avoid gridlock in the consultation stage,
the LDTU sets an 18-month time frame for
completion of delineation and introduces
principles of popular determination whereby
final decisions on boundary changes are sub-
ject to referendum by residents affected by
annexation. To date, only 17 municipal gov-
ernments resolved boundary conflicts fol-
lowing LDTU guidelines and, in total, only
25 (7%) out of now 336 municipalities have
officially recognised boundaries (Tomaselli,
2015). Several problems, hence, remain pre-
valent and explain a backlog. Most munici-
pal governments opted against the initiation
of the LDTU process. This is because
the LDTU does not automatically replace
LAPU procedures but both legislative
options co-exist. While first-time delineation
applicants must follow LDTU guidelines,
municipalities that previously initiated an
application under the LAPU are permitted
to continue with this process and often
remain gridlocked in the consultation stage.
Calculated informality Bolivia
style: The politics of
hyperregulation
What are the underlying political motiva-
tions for maintaining municipal boundary
conflicts? What are the associated implica-
tions for the governance and planning of
peri-urban spaces? A senior official in
Bolivia’s Ministry of Autonomies provided
some tentative answers to these questions:
Places affected by boundary conflicts are
lucrative sites. Here, most of our country’s
urban development happens. A situation with
unclear municipal boundaries provides flexibil-
ity for urban development to happen. For this
reason, we face a lot of resistance to resolve
boundary conflicts, including by people within
our own national government. Basically, if
you have boundary conflicts, you have differ-
ent municipalities who are active in the same
area and this is of benefit for some influential
people. What one local authority declares ille-
gal is declared legal by the next as all compete
over resources and political control. This cre-
ates winners and losers. Most people lose out
because they do not know how the system
works and they lack influential contacts. But
some, especially loteadores [a term used in
Bolivia to refer to actors involved in plot-by-
plot rural-to-urban land conversions], know
the laws and different procedures by distinct
government authorities. This legal know-how
provides them with opportunities, for example
to undertake land conversions. The people
involved in such transactions have political
weight, and they have an interest in the conti-
nuation of boundary conflicts. For this reason,
there is no serious attempt to resolve these con-
flicts (Interview, 22 November 2016).
The processes described in this testimony
challenge previous research in Latin
America in general (Riofrı́o, 2003; Ziccardi,
2020), and Bolivia in particular (Blanco
Cazas, 2017; Perales Miranda, 2011), which
considers that developments in peri-urban
spaces are characterised by the absence of
government regulation and planning.
Instead of state absence, it is argued here
that developments in peri-urban spaces in
Bolivia occur in contexts where different
entities of the state are present. In particular,
the Bolivia case allows for an analysis of the
specific multi-scalar governance configura-
tions, namely the introduction of national
government legislation that seems to be
deliberately engineered to allow local gov-
ernments to remain gridlocked in municipal
boundary conflicts, thereby generating a
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situation in which multiple local jurisdic-
tions, who follow distinct urban and rural
regulatory and planning frameworks, exer-
cise political control within the same peri-
urban space. It is this situation that is
referred to here as hyperregulation.
The analysis of hyperregulation presented
in this article is positioned within, and fur-
ther nuances, conceptual debates on calcu-
lated informality, a situation that ‘involves
purposive planning and action and one
where the seeming withdrawal of regulatory
power creates a logic of resource allocation,
accumulation and authority’ (Roy, 2009:
80). Previous urban research, for example,
deploys a calculated informality perspective
to highlight how planning authorities in
Israel selectively apply land regulations to
‘whiten’ occupation practices by Jewish set-
tlers while ‘darkening’ nomadic land-use
patterns by indigenous Bedouins (Yiftachel,
2006), or how local authorities in Beirut,
Lebanon issue exceptions for real estate
developers (Fawaz, 2017). In Bolivia, a cal-
culated informality perspective has to date
only been applied by urban anthropologist
Goldstein (2016) in his study on deliberate
state neglect of informal market traders, and
especially street vendors, operating in
Cochabamba’s informal market ‘La
Cancha’. Goldstein (2016: 7) identified a
dynamic of state-organised disorder which
he refers to as disregulation – a scenario
whereby the ‘market’s chaos (like that of
other neglected spaces, including poor urban
neighbourhoods) is to a large degree engi-
neered’ by the state who ‘administers its own
preferred forms of regulation while ignoring
others’.
Hyperregulation shares with other find-
ings on calculated informality that it can be
considered, to paraphrase Goldstein (2016:
7), as ‘organised disorder that is the result of
the state’s presence rather than its absence’.
But hyperregulation also differs from other
articulations of calculated informality.
Contrary to a situation of state withdrawal,
exceptionalism or disregulation, hyperregu-
lation leads to a situation where different
jurisdictions overlap – something Agnew
and Oslender (2010) refer to as ‘overlapping
territories’ and which has been noted also
for other Latin American peri-urban settings
(Lombard, 2016). Such a situation leads to
the co-existence of distinct legal and plan-
ning regimes without clear coordination – a
situation also often referred to as legal plur-
alism (Griffiths, 1986; von Benda-
Beckmann, 2002) – that offer multiple, and
at times contradictory and conflicting, path-
ways on how to govern, manage and plan
places in urban transition. Hyperregulation
can be a short-term phenomenon that occurs
when legal regimes fade-in – for example,
when urban land regimes are introduced in
rural settings or when colonial regimes intro-
duce new rules on colonised territory – while
others disappear (von Benda-Beckmann and
von Benda-Beckmann, 2014). In Bolivia,
however, hyperregulation seems to be delib-
erately maintained through unresolved
municipal boundary conflicts and represents
a long-term phenomenon that has prevailed
since the mid-1990s. Finally, unlike previous
research which emphasised the key role of
the state in creating and mobilising calcu-
lated informality, the findings presented in
subsequent sections reveal that hyperregula-
tion not only unfolds through state practices
but through interactions of a loose coalition
of members of the public, private and civil
society sectors.
Hyperregulation in practice: The
case of peri-urban La Paz
This section reveals how hyperregulation
unfolds in practice through the implementa-
tion of different approaches to planning and
governance by distinct local authorities oper-
ating within the same area. It also discusses
how a loose coalition of elite actors make
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strategic use of this situation to advance spe-
cific political and socio-economic interests.
Using hyperregulation to gain political
control
The municipal governments of La Paz and
Palca both operate within peri-urban neigh-
bourhoods in Southern La Paz. In line with
established rural-urban dichotomies outlined
in section three, both municipalities strategi-
cally draw on distinct approaches to expand
their political influence in disputed terri-
tories, engage in vote-seeking practices and
increase revenues through charging, among
other issues, for services and building
permits.
The municipal government of La Paz fol-
lows an urban development approach,
thereby presuming that these peri-urban
places are in transition towards urban mod-
ernity while failing to cater to more rural ele-
ments. La Paz mainly engages in these areas
through zoning and land use planning activi-
ties. For example, in 2011 the municipal
government released an integrated land use
plan for the peri-urban neighbourhood of
Ovejuyo which divided this area into resi-
dential, business, protected and high-risk
zones. La Paz’s municipal charter (Carta
Organica) ratified in 2012 as well as the
municipal government’s integrated develop-
ment plan (Plan 2040) valid from 2015 to
2040 further emphasise the need to register
occupied plots within peri-urban neighbour-
hoods; this is considered to be a precondi-
tion for the provision of services and public
infrastructure (Horn, 2019). When register-
ing plots of land and issuing title deeds, La
Paz follows the 2012 Law to Regulate
Property Rights over Urban Estates and
Housing which only recognises individual
tenure within urban conglomerations.
To implement the above-mentioned
plans, La Paz introduced a municipal
boundary fund that provides local district
authorities operating in peri-urban neigh-
bourhoods with an additional annual budget
of USD $1.9 million. Between 2012 and
2016, district authorities in La Paz’s
Southern Zone granted tenure rights to 55%
of households in Ovejuyo and more than
80% of households in Achumani, Cota Cota
and Chasquipampa. Aligning with the 1994
LPP, district authorities also undertook
annual participatory budgeting activities
with neighbourhood associations, leading to
the implementation of 150 road and public
infrastructure improvement schemes in peri-
urban neighbourhoods between 2012 and
2019. While municipal officials highlighted
that these interventions mainly address basic
needs of residents, a senior civil servant in
La Paz’s territorial planning unit provided
an additional justification:
Through our interventions in these areas we
increase our political influence. By providing
residents with tenure rights we hope to gain new
constituents who vote for us in elections and in
case of a referendum around jurisdictional
boundaries’ (Interview, 10 December 2012).
Such interventions, hence, also represent a
deliberate mechanism to deepen political
control within disputed territories, confirm-
ing previous research that highlights infra-
structure politics (referred to as obrismo in
Bolivia) as a common clientelist practice
mobilised by national and local government
authorities in Bolivia to gain political sup-
port prior to elections (Lazar, 2004).
The municipal government of Palca fol-
lows a distinct governance approach.
Differences in approaches are understand-
able, especially when contrasting the unique
characteristics of Palca to those of La Paz.
In addition to disputed peri-urban areas,
Palca’s jurisdiction mainly contains rural
areas inhabited primarily by indigenous peo-
ples. Unlike La Paz, where the political
party Movement Without Fear (MSM)
holds a majority, Palca’s municipal council
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is controlled by the Movement for Socialism
(MAS) – a political party with stronger ties
to the country’s peasant and indigenous
movements and also in control of Bolivia’s
current national government. In contrast to
La Paz, which represents one of Bolivia’s
wealthiest municipal governments, Palca’s
municipal government is under-resourced,
employing less than 100 members of staff
and relying on an annual budget of approxi-
mately USD $5 million. Lacking human and
financial resources, Palca struggles to pro-
vide basic services to residents. According to
a World Vision (2012) study, 98.7% of
Palca’s rural residents lack access to basic
physical and socio-economic infrastructure
such as paved roads, water or sanitation.
A core objective of the municipality of
Palca, hence, is to increase political influence
in more populated peri-urban areas and gen-
erate revenues through collecting taxes and
building permit charges. A senior civil ser-
vant working in the municipality explained
this as follows:
We lack resources because La Paz is stealing
our land. (.) By regaining political control
over this area [referring to peri-urban neigh-
bourhoods in Southern La Paz], we can
increase our budget (Interview, 17 January
2013).
To substantiate its influence, Palca respects
tenure rights of indigenous comuneros but
also issues permissions for land subdivisions
as well as construction permits not only to
comuneros but also to private enterprises
interested in investing in the area. Unlike La
Paz, however, Palca’s municipal government
does not draw on an integrated development
plan nor on land use plans. This reflects
wider trends noted in Bolivia where smaller
rural municipalities are often reported to fail
to apply planning mechanisms introduced by
the national government due a lack of expe-
rience and limited capacity (Kohl, 2003).
Lacking a clear spatial planning framework,
Palca tends to issue permissions to develop
land in areas otherwise declared as protected
and grants more flexible building permis-
sions, often ignoring building standards and
height restrictions outlined by La Paz’s
municipal government.
In contrast to La Paz which only recog-
nises individual tenure, Palca follows a rural
development framework for peri-urban
areas and recognises collective tenure rights,
particularly for indigenous comuneros who
used to inhabit these lands prior to urbanisa-
tion. Staff in Palca’s municipality referred to
relevant national government legislation,
including the 1953 Agrarian Reform Decree
and Bolivia’s 2009 constitution, to justify
this land management approach. Following
reforms linked to the 1953 Agrarian Reform
Decree, ex-hacienda5 lands were redistribu-
ted to indigenous peasant families.
Interviews with comuneros in Chasquipampa
and Ovejuyo revealed that local families
received approximately three hectares of
agricultural land per household. They were
also granted collective rights to manage
common land. Palca recognises these tenure
rights up until the present. In addition, and
building on article 30.1 of Bolivia’s 2009
constitution which outlines specific indigen-
ous rights (see section 3), Palca grants comu-
neros the right to self-govern their territories
and to be consulted about interventions tak-
ing place on their lands. According to a
senior official from Palca, respecting indi-
genous rights also represents a vote-seeking
strategy as it serves to maintain ‘a support
base among original residents of this terri-
tory’ (Interview, 17 November 2016). At the
same time, though, as evident in the below
testimony by the mayor of Palca, the pro-
motion of an indigenous rights-based
approach also has more pragmatic reasons:
Brother Evo [referring to former President
Evo Morales] and his government clearly say
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in the constitution that our indigenous original
peasants can govern themselves according to
their own principles. This is what we allow our
residents to do in our municipality. What else
should we do? The few people that work in the
municipality do not have the resources to exer-
cise control (Interview, 18 January 2013).
Political control within the same peri-urban
area is, as suggested in the above testimony,
exercised not only by local government
authorities from La Paz and Palca but also
by actors operating outside the state such as
indigenous comuneros. The next section
explores in further detail how non-state
actors benefit from hyperregulation to
advance their own interests.
The winners and losers of hyperregulation
In addition to local government authorities,
other elite actors, including first and fore-
most resident leaders representing comuneros
but also private sector representatives, take
advantage of hyperregulation. Local leaders
tend to form part of, both, indigenous pea-
sant unions that interact with Palca and
neighbourhood associations that interact
with La Paz, and they are aware of the dif-
ferent governance approaches promoted by
these municipalities. This is evident in a tes-
timony of a comunero leader from Ovejuyo:
When in the municipality of La Paz, we need
to talk urban politics. In La Paz it is about
individual tenure rights and services for new
plots. When in the municipality of Palca, we
talk about collective indigenous rights
(Interview, 29 March 2018).
Crucially, as evidenced below, local leaders
strategically manoeuvre between the political
agendas and governance approaches of both
municipalities to advance their own interests.
A key interest shared by many local lead-
ers is to profit from rural-to-urban land con-
versions. To achieve this, local leaders often
engage in processes that resemble what
Karaman et al. (2020: 1125) define as plot-
ting – the ‘subdivision of land into individ-
ual plots with fragmented ownership or
entitlement’ through a ‘piecemeal plot-by-
plot pattern of urbanisation’. Plotting
(referred to as loteamiento in Bolivia) in
peri-urban La Paz can be summarised
through Francisco’s story, a comunero leader
and loteador (a person engaged in plotting),
member of a peasant union in Ovejuyo and
of a neighbourhood association in
Chasquipampa. Francisco’s family previ-
ously owned two large plots of agricultural
land in Chasquipampa and Ovejuyo, both
registered by Palca. In the early 1990s,
Francisco and his brother sold parts of their
land in Chasquipampa to incoming migrants
who self-constructed houses. Buyers only
received a confirmation of payment (in
Spanish: minuta de compra) while Francisco
held onto the original title deed issued by
Palca and negotiated with this municipal
government on behalf of his buyers to
obtain building permits. In the meantime,
Francisco noted that buyers obtained indi-
vidual tenure rights from La Paz and negoti-
ated access to road infrastructure and basic
services such as water and electricity from
this municipality. He claimed that, because
of these interventions, land prices tripled
from USD $15/m2 in the early 1990s to
USD $45/m2 in the early 2000s. This encour-
aged him to further subdivide his agricul-
tural land in Chasquipampa. This time, with
support from friends in a construction com-
pany, he constructed 20 houses which were
subsequently put out for rent. At this stage,
Francisco – through his involvement in the
local neighbourhood association – negoti-
ated directly with La Paz to secure individ-
ual tenure rights and apply for the
expansion of services to new houses. In
recent years, he engaged in similar process
of plot-by-plot urbanisation on his agricul-
tural land in Ovejuyo, stating that ‘making
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use of what Palca and La Paz have to offer
is key for these land deals’ (Interview, 29
March 2018). Most comunero leaders
approached for this research alluded to
being involved in similar practices of plot-
by-plot urbanisation which require them to
carefully manoeuvre between municipal
authorities in Palca – who grant subdivisions
and provide construction permits – and La
Paz – who issue individual tenure and urban
services for new developments.
While such transactions benefit comunero
leaders with larger landholdings, ordinary
residents who rent or purchase plots of land,
often only receiving a minuta de compra for
the latter, are left in a precarious situation.
Some residents reported that comuneros
simultaneously sell plots or rent out housing
units to multiple people. Tenure insecurity
also remains a concern for those residents
who secured tenure from La Paz as comunero
landowners keep hold of their original title
deed registered with Palca. The below testi-
mony of Maria, who migrated to Ovejuyo
from a rural community near Bolivia’s Lake
Titicaca, illustrates how residents cope with
conflicts around tenure and plot occupation:
In 1998 we started the complex bureaucratic
journey of applying for a land title. We
received some support from the local neigh-
bourhood association. It took us two years to
fulfil all the bureaucratic formalities to eventu-
ally receive a land title from La Paz. In 2002 a
person who identified himself as ex-comunero
from Ovejuyo knocked on our door and
claimed that the plot belonged to him. He
proved that he owned this land by showing us
an authorised land title from Palca. We closed
our door so that he could not enter. From that
moment onward, to avoid that the comunero
takes over what he considers to be his plot, I
make sure that our house is always occupied.
The comunero returned to our house a few
more times but so far, I prevented him from
taking over our plot. (Personal communica-
tion, 7 December 2012).
Ordinary residents are, hence, not passive
victims but, like the urban majority living in
peripheral settlements in Latin America
(Caldeira, 2017), they do their best to stay
put, relying mainly on tactics of occupation,
self-help and self-defence.
In addition to plotting practices of locals
comuneros, more large-scale developments –
promoted by non-resident private enter-
prises – are also underway in peri-urban La
Paz. According to data received from La
Paz’s planning secretary, between June 2015
and June 2016 alone, 272 illicit land develop-
ments covering an area of approximately
19,500 hectares took place in areas affected
by municipal boundary conflicts. Most of
these developments occurred in areas
declared as environmentally protected zones
by La Paz and/or on lands owned by comu-
neros. Illicit land developments include,
among others, terracing work (in Spanish:
terraceo) undertaken by construction com-
panies who, through dynamite explosions,
flatten larger areas in mountainous terrain
to facilitate housing developments. As
widely reported in local media, dynamite
explosions are felt throughout adjacent
neighbourhoods where residents often report
the destruction of windows and brick mate-
rial. Terracing also contributes to the ero-
sion of land as well as to an increase in
landslides. In addition, local residents
reported that mining companies extract and
load sand, gravel, grit and other materials
from local riverbeds situated in areas
declared as environmentally protected zones
by La Paz to produce concrete that can be
used for local housing developments.
According to a councillor from La Paz,
not much can be done to stop such practices
as they are rendered legal by Palca, the
national government or comunero leaders:
The boundary problem stops us from acting.
All these companies can legitimise their
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practices by showing authorisations from
Palca or from local indigenous leaders. More
recently a company even had an official
authorisation from the Ministry of Defence to
undertake dynamite explosions. What seems
illegal from our perspective, is declared legal
by others and once the developments are
underway it is hard to stop them. It is also
hard to evict people from illicit housing devel-
opments as this is an unpopular measure. So,
instead, and to build relationships with locals,
we identify ways to work with them
(Interview, 22 November 2016).
This testimony, hence, describes a cycle of
peri-urban development activities and how
these are facilitated by a loose coalition of
elite actors operating in a context of hyper-
regulation. Palca issues permissions for land
and housing developments as well as
resource extraction activities on territories
declared as environmentally protected zones
by La Paz. When asked about the legal basis
for such activities, Palca’s mayor cited
Bolivia’s Law 3425, which declares munici-
pal governments responsible for regulating
resource extraction activities, or highlighted
that these developments take place on lands
of comuneros and that their authorities
should allow or prohibit such interventions.
Comunero leaders generally supported terra-
cing and mining activities as is evident in this
testimony by Pedro, comunero and peasant
union leader from Chasquipampa:
We have the right to control what happens
on our land. So, when a company wants to
do something on our land, I start negotiating
with them. If the payment is right, I allow
them to do activities on my land. This is how
we do politics here (Interview, 18 November
2016).
Once developments unfold, private compa-
nies or affected residents often approach La
Paz to claim access to urban services (in case
of housing developments) or relocation (in
case of landslides caused by dynamite explo-
sions). Local authorities from La Paz gener-
ally seem to respond positively to these
demands, avoiding political conflict and
instead seeking to expand their own electoral
support base.
Discussion and conclusion
Unlike previous research which highlights
that peri-urban developments in Latin
America, and particularly in Bolivia, are
characterised by state absence and a lack of
regulation and planning, this article demon-
strated that such developments occur pre-
cisely because of the presence of particular
multi-scalar governance configurations.
Focusing on peri-urban La Paz, the article
revealed how national legislation on decen-
tralisation and delineation, which fails to
establish clear guidelines around jurisdic-
tional boundaries, leads to a situation of
hyperregulation whereby multiple local
authorities claim political control over the
same territory by deploying distinct, and at
times conflicting, regulatory and planning
frameworks. This contributes to incoheren-
cies within policy domains such as land
management, housing or environmental
protection.
Evidence from peri-urban La Paz suggests
that hyperregulation enables a loose coali-
tion of elite actors, including government
authorities but also private sector represen-
tatives and local resident leaders, to advance
specific political and socio-economic inter-
ests. Government authorities benefit from
hyperregulation as it enables them to expand
their territorial reach, grow their electoral
support base prior to local elections and gen-
erate additional revenues. Private sector rep-
resentatives and especially resident leaders,
who represent landowning comuneros and
act as local intermediaries between residents
and different entities of the state, make use
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of hyperregulation to engage in speculative
peri-urban land developments. These include
rural-to-urban land conversions on a plot-
by-plot basis (confirming trends observed
elsewhere by Karaman et al., 2020), large-
scale ‘terracing’ efforts, and mining activities
occurring on land otherwise declared as
environmentally protected zone. While ser-
ving elite interests, the article also outlines
the adverse consequences of hyperregula-
tion, including environmental degradation
as well as tenure insecurity and displacement
risks for ordinary residents. Such trends are
by no means unique to peri-urban La Paz.
Newspapers in Bolivia frequently report that
boundary conflicts, which affect 311 (93 per
cent of all) local jurisdictions, represent one
of the main driving forces for irregular
developments in the country.6 Further
research could draw on and apply the con-
cept of hyperregulation to make sense of
development processes occurring elsewhere
in Bolivia.
The article contributes to broader con-
ceptual and policy debates around what Roy
(2009) refers to as calculated informality, a
situation that is generally considered to be
the outcome of state engineering and
achieved through processes of withdrawal,
deregulation or exceptionalism. Confirming
such trends, previous research by Goldstein
(2016: 247) on informal market relations in
Cochambamba highlights that calculated
informality in Bolivia is produced through
disregulation, defined as the arbitrary appli-
cation of regulations by the state to generate
a situation of ‘organised disorder’ which
allows local authorities to ‘interpret their
mission and enact it though practices that
they develop in response to local exigencies
and their own personal objectives’. The find-
ings of this paper on hyperregulation nuance
debates on calculated informality in two
important ways. First, the article reveals that
‘organised disorder’ may not just be the
outcome of state withdrawal or disregula-
tion. Instead, such a situation can also be
created by allowing the uncoordinated co-
existence of different regulatory and plan-
ning regimes. Second, this article highlights
that calculated informality is not just the
result of state engineering and, instead, more
attention needs to be paid to how situations
of ‘organised disorder’ are generated
through multi-level governance arrange-
ments that include elite actors associated
with the state but also with the private sector
and civil society. More research is required to
better understand the multi-scalar governance
configurations and the composition as well as
motivations of different actors belonging to
elite coalitions that shape overlapping govern-
ance regimes elsewhere in different politico-
legal environments.
Finally, this article reveals how efforts to
better manage and control peri-urban devel-
opment processes (in this case through deli-
neation reforms) are often ineffective and
disappointing, though understandable when
examined through the perspective of several
elite actors. Even those actors who might be
considered the ‘losers’ of hyperregulation
(e.g. residents who lack tenure rights or who
obtained tenure rights from La Paz for a
plot that is also claimed by comuneros who
still hold title deeds from Palca) could poten-
tially be worse off in a situation of resolved
boundary conflicts. For example, residents
who obtained a title deed from La Paz
would most likely lose their tenure rights in
a situation where their land would be consid-
ered part of the jurisdiction of Palca. A con-
clusion from this article, then, is that any
effort towards greater policy coherence in
emerging urban places must embrace several
different, and at times conflicting, interests.
In peri-urban La Paz, and most likely else-
where in Bolivia and the global South, this
means departing from historically rooted
rural-urban dichotomies; it also requires
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adaptability and the ability to harmonise
and promote coherence between heteroge-
nous ways of understanding and governing
places in urban transition.
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1. Bolivia shifted from being a predominantly
rural society in the early 1900s to an urban
society. By 2019, approximately 70% of the
country’s population lived in cities. While
containing only one major city – La Paz – in
1950, by 2012 Bolivia contained five major
cities with more than 250,000 inhabitants as
well as 27 intermediate towns with 20,000 to
250,000 inhabitants and 134 minor urban set-
tlements with 2000 to 20,000 inhabitants (see
Horn, 2018; Torrico Foronda, 2011).
2. By focusing on ‘governance’, and not ‘gov-
ernment’, this article recognises shifts towards
‘good urban governance’ that occurred across
the globe since the 1990s and that require
local governments to be more proactive in
involving public, private and civil society
actors in decision making processes (Pierre,
1999). By multi-scalar, the article refers to the
continuous rescaling of urban governance
arrangements upwards (e.g. to institutions at
higher levels such as national governments or
international organisations), sidewards (e.g.
to other policy sectors) and downwards (e.g.
to institutions and organisations at lower lev-
els such as local enterprises or community-
based organisations) and associated coordi-
nation efforts and power dynamics between
actors involved in these processes (Jessop,
2009). A multi-scalar governance approach is
considered valuable as it demonstrates how
peri-urban spaces are shaped by a variety of
actors with distinct levels of power and by
processes and relations that always exceed
their local geographical boundaries.
3. The speculative practices discussed here are
not unique to peri-urban La Paz. According
to Smolka (2003), in Latin American coun-
tries such as Bolivia, where social security
systems are weak, land speculation is not
exclusive to high-income areas and holding
on and selling land represents an important
value reserve and a popular means of
capitalisation.
4. For a detailed overview on the often-
conflicting use of ethno-racial categories such
as indigeneity in current rural and urban poli-
tics in Bolivia, especially under the govern-
ment led by former President Evo Morales,
see Postero (2017).
5. Haciendas represented large landed estates
in which labourers – often of indigenous
descent – were directly employed by the
hacienda owners (often representing non-
indigenous peoples and sometimes descen-
dants of the colonisers) and worked in semi-
feudal conditions (see also Keith, 1971).
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